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I. INTRODUCTION
The jute manufacturing industry, which was nationalised 
along with other industries soon after liberation, is the most 
important industry of Bangladesh both in terms of production and 
employment and in terms of foreign exchange earnings. However, 
it is now well known that the industry has been suffering losses 
since liberation. This study has ben undertaken to evaluate the 
performance of the industry during July-December 1972 (i) to 
provide an estimate of losses incurred, (ii) to analyse the 
causes therefor and (iii) to discuss possible ways of improving 
the performance of the industry. July-becember 1972 has been
t . vchosen as the reference period because relevant data are available 
for this period and it is believed that these months would 
represent the general post-liberation situation in the industry.
* The author is a Research Economist at the Bangladesh Institute 
of Development Economics. He is thankful to Dr. M. Alamgir and 
Mr, Abu Ahmed Abdullah, a Senior Research Economist and a 
Research Economist respectively at the Institute for reading 
the first draft of the paper and suggesting improvements.
However, the sole responsibility for any errors and inadequancies 
in the paper rests with the author alone. Research Assistance 
provided by Mr. Dilip Kumar Roy and Mr. Karimull&h Bhuiyan, both 
Assistant Staff Economists at the Institute, is gratefully 
acknowledged. Thanks are also due to officials of Bangladesh 
Jute Mills Corporation (BJMC) and Bangladesh Jute Mills Associa­
tion (BJMA), whose kind cooperation made collection of data for 
this study possible.
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II. THE METHODOLOGY AND THE DATA
METHODOLOGY
Operating profit (loss) during any period (t) is defined 
as the excess (shortfall) of the value of sales out of produc­
tion during t over (from) the cost of these sales. Per unit 
operating profit or loss is an useful concept as, given the 
demand conditions, it reflects production efficiency in t.
To compute the total profit earned or loss incurred in t, 
receipts from total sales in t are to he matched against total 
costs associated with the sales. In the computation of total 
cost of sales, the question of adjustment for opening and closing 
stocks comes in^ . Total cost of goods sold in t are given by 
total cost incurred for production, administration and selling 
purposes in t plus cost of goods carried over from the previous
period (t-1) incurred in t-1 minus cost of goods carried forward
oto the following period (t'Sl) .
In the jute manufacturing industry of Banglad_esh which is
1. The evaluation of costs of stocks carried over from t-1 and 
sold in t in terms of cost in t-1 makes a significant impact on 
total profit (loss) in t when costs are significantly different 
between t and t-1 and the stocks involved are large.
2. The concepts of cost of production, cost of goods produced 
and cost of sales (i.e. goods sold), as used in this paper, have 
the following meaning. Cost of production consists of material 
and conversion costs and does not include (normal) profit; cost 
of goods produced means cost of production plus administrative 
expenses (i.e. expenses incurred in head office, fees paid to 
managing agents etc.); and cost of sales includes selling 
expenses in addition (to cost of production and administrative expenses).
an export industry with a negligible domestic market , the
profitability mainly depends on the export price realised (foreign
demand conditions) and the cost of sales. As will be seen later,
it is the unusually increased cost of sales since liberation
that is mainly responsible for the difficulties of the industry.
Losses were incurred inspite of the very high prices charged.
Hence, in seeking out the reasons for the difficulties of the
industry, the main focus will be on the supply conditions. Cost
reduction possibilities will be explored by reference to 1969-70
costs allowing for exogenous cost push changes that took place
since then but assuming the same productive efficiency and capa-
5city utilization level^ as well as by working out cost reduction 
implications of increased output levels. Foreign demand condi­
tions will also be examined to derive estimates of export prices 
which may promote exports to desired levels. Cost levels will be 
related to these computed export prices to explore the question 
of the exchange rate vis-a-vis the viability of the industry.
3. During July-December 1972, domestic sales accounted for Just 
over 3% of hessian production, about 11% of sacking production 
and no carpet backing.
A. 1969-70 is in common use as providing the norm for comparative 
evaluation of performance indicators during post-liberation period. 
1969-70 was reasonably free from abnormalities. Besides, this is 
the only year for which we have relevant data.
3. In this paper, "capacity utilization" will be used to mean 
simply looms worked in relation to looms installed or, more 
precisely, loom hours worked in relation to loom hours available 
in a given time period. Productive efficiency reflects efficiency 
in the use of all the resources used.
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SOURCE OF DATA
The main products of hessian, sacking and carpet backing 
are considered in this paper. The 'others1, such as twine, cotton 
bagging etc., are not considered since relevant data for these 
products are not available. However, these are relatively un­
important products, accounting for only 5*3% of the total 
tonnage of output and much less in value terms during July- 
December 1972.
Required data for the period July-December 1972 have been 
compiled from monthly performance reports of mills available 
from Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation (BJMC). At first we 
thought of random selection of a sample but that was not possible 
as reports from all the mills were not available and some of the 
available reports were not useable due to incompleteness. Hence 
the sample was dictated, by the availability of data. However, 
fortunately, it has turned out that mills from all the three 
zones, viz., Dacca, Khulna and Chittagong, of all sizes and of 
good and not-so-good reputation for efficiency have found place 
in the sample. The sample consists of 22 mills, of which 2 are 
only carpet backing mills. Of the remaining 20 mills producing 
hessian and sacking, 11 mills also produced carpet backing which 
means that the number of mills in the sample producing carpet 
backing is 13. Regarding the quality of the data, it should be 
mentioned that their reliability may not be beyond doubt; but, 
we believe that generally their quality is reasonab3.y good to 
yield useful conclusions.
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The data for 1969-70 have been taken from returns of a 
survey of the jute manufacturing industry of Bangladesh under­
taken by the present author in late 19706. This sample is also 
dictated by data availability but here also mills from all the 
three zones, of all sizes and of different kinds of reputation 
for efficiency are included. The sample for 1969-70 consists 
of 12 mills, of which all the 12 provide data for hessian and 
sacking and 4- for carpet backing. As for quality, we believe 
these data are quite reliable as these were collected from mills 
directlyo
The coverage of the two samples in respect of number of 
mills, installed loomage, output and export by product (i#e. in 
terms of the number of mills producing a particular product, the 
installed capacity for it and its output and export in the sample 
relative to the corresponding totals for the industry) has been 
shown in table 1 « An examination of the table suggests the 
conclusion that there is no excessive bias for any product, in 
any of the two samples, one way or the other in respect of size 
and productivity to vitiate their otherwise representative 
character,
6. For more about this survey see Ahmad, Q.K. "A Note on Capacity 
Utilization in the Jute Manufacturing Industry of Bangladesh";
The Bangladesh Economic Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1973; Footnote 7 .’
7* It may be pointed out here that basic data, obtained from 
sample surveys or otherwise, from which the tables in this paper 
have been prepared are given in the Appendix and, for the source 
of any table, reference may be made to relevant Appendix table or tables.
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TABLE-1
COVERAGE OF THE SAMPLES FOR JULY-DECEMBER 1972 
AND 1969-70 BY PRODUCT (IN PERCENT).
Reference
period
9 9 Percent 
5 Product- j of mills 
5 line 8 covered
0 5 
5 8
i Percent 
5 of inst­
il ailed 
5 loomage 
$ covered
9 Percent 
5 output 
5 covered 
8 
5
oflfpercent of 
8 exports 
iS covered
i
i
July- Hessian 38 o 5 39-7 46.9 47.7December Sacking $8*5 39.8 4-5.4- 40.11972 Carpet 4-0,6 37.3 4-0.0 35.0backing
1969-70 Hessian 26 P 27.6 28.1 28.8Sacking 26«7 27.2 27.4- 28.7Carpet backing 55-5 36 o 6 34-.0 30.3
III, PERFORMANCE OF THE INDUSTRY DURING JULY-DECEMBER 
1972
As will be seen below, losses were incurred in all the 
three productlines during July-December 1972.
A. PER TON OPERATING RESULTS (LOSSES) 
IN THE PERIOD
Per ton operating results for export during July-December 
1972 by product are shown in table 2. It will be seen that for 
all products substantial losses wrere incurred during the period 
under review, the greatest being in the case of hessian. The 
average per ton loss of about Taka 291 for all the products over 
a period of six months is a serious matter.
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TABLE-2
PER TON OPERATING LOSS DUE TO EXPORT BY PRODUCT 
DURING JULY-DECEMBER 1972 (IN TAKA)
Product 05
5
5
Per ton 
cost of
sale
0
5
5
5
Per ton 
value of 
sale
|T Per ton loss 
Q due to export
Hessian 4579.82 3932.19 447.63
Sacking 2855.61 2676.21 162.40
Carpet backing 5001.13 4819.71 174.60
Weighted* Average: 
Hessian & Sacking 3619.14 3312.01 307.13
Weighted* Average: 
Hessian, Sacking & 
Carpet backing 3803.70 3513.34 290.69
*Weights are proportional to quantities exported of 
different products.
Some quantities of hessian and sacking were also sold 
domestically during July-December 1972 - 3*7% a^d 14,7% of total 
sales of the two products respectively. The operating results 
in respect of domestic sales are shown in Table 3. Lor domestic 
sales also, losses were incurred for both hessian and sacking. 
Here also, the per ton loss was the larger in the case of hessian 
and the average loss for hessian and sacking was Taka 105.24 
per ton.
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TABLE-3
PER TON OPERATING RESULTS FOR DOMESTIC SALES 
BY PRODUCT, JULY-DEC EMBER 1972.
Product 0Per ton cost 
3 of sales 
8
$ Per ton value 
3 of domestic 
3 sales
Q Per ton loss due 
{ to domestic sales.
3
Hessian 4-379.82 4-157.28 222.54-
Sacking 2835.61 274-6.3 7 89.24-
Average 3020.92 2915.68 105.24-
B. AN ESTIMATE OF TOTAL LOSS INCURRED 
DURING THE PERIOD
As mentioned earlier, total profit or loss in the period 
will he obtained by matching total receipts from sales in the 
period against total cost of sales, the latter involving costing 
of goods sold out of current production as well as of goods sold 
out of stocks. Since direct information on costs of opening and 
closing stocks were not available, the following procedure has 
been followed here.
To be sure, selling expenses incurred in t should be 
associated with goods sold in t (which may include quantities 
carried over from t-1 and exclude quantities out of production 
in t which are carried forward as stocks to t+1)• It Is assumed 
that stocks carried over from t-1 will all be sold during tp so 
that all stocks carried forward to t+1 will be out of production
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in t (assuming sales in t are larger than stocks carried over from 
t-1). This assumption will allow us to divide total cost incurred 
in t for production and administrative purposes between sales out 
of production in t and stocks carried forward to t+1. To calculate 
the total cost of sales in t, we are, then, to add cost of stocks 
carried over from t-1 incurred in t-1 plus any cost incurred for 
them in t and total selling expenses incurred in t to the produc­
tion and administrative expenses incurred in respect of goods 
sold out of production in t. If we now have an estimate of cost 
of goods produced in (t-1), we can compute the total cost of 
sales in t.
Table 4 shows export and domestic sales of hessian, sacking 
and carpet backing during July-December 1972. The table also 
shows how much of the total sales came out of stocks from the 
previous period and how much out of current production on the 
assumption that stocks carried over from the previous period 
were all sold during July-December 1972.
TABLE-4
SALES DURING JULY-DECEMBER 1972 AND THEIR SUPPLY 
DISTRIBUTION AS BETWEEN STOCKS CARRIED OVER FROM 
THE PREVIOUS PERIOD AND CURRENT PRODUCTION(IN TONS)
Product ;
i
Sales j Supply of sales
Export\ & domestic5
Q Total
5
Q Out of stocks
5
5 Out of current 
5 production
Hessian 75,252 2,764 78,016 53,355 24,661
Sacking 86,9^ -6 12,760 99,706 35,675 64,031
Carpet
Backing 31,1^9 - 31,149 8,609 22,540
Total: 193,54-7 15,524 208,871 97,639 111,252
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Now, to estimate the total loss incurred during July- 
December 1972, the one more requirement is the cost associated 
with stocks carried over from pre-July 1972. But, it has not been 
possible to assemble cost data for that period from any source. 
First, performance reports, particularly with cost data, for 
months prior to July 1972 are not generally available with BJMC. 
The very few cost figures that could be obtained appeared to be 
rather wild and could not, therefore, be used. Also, our efforts 
at collecting cost data for that period directly from mills were 
unsuccessful. We were, thus, left with no other choice but to 
make some intelligent guess about the required cost figures.
Cost levels in the months prior to July-December 1972 could not 
possibly be lower than during July-December 1972, and perhaps 
were higher if anything, as would seem to be indicated by the 
following considerations. First, wage increase was effective 
since May 1, 1972* Secondly, the mar-ket price of jute was alrea­
dy more than Taka 50 per maund, the minimum price fixed with 
effect from October 1, 1972, since soon after liberation. Thirdly, 
the output level was lower even during April-June 1972 (38.3 
thousand tons per month) than during July-December 1972 (39-9
othousand tons per month) . Besides, the labour situation was 
certainly poorer in that period and the industry was in the
8. Ref: For April-June 1972, Monthly Jute Goods Statistics, 
July 1972 (BJMA) and for July-December 1972 Appendix table 2,
process of settling down under public management with, new mana­
gement personnel being appointed in different mills, creating 
.adjustment problems in many cases. One possible lower cost 
element in that period was perhaps somewhat lower prices of 
spares, but this is unlikely to mean much in terms of total cost 
of sales. Indeed, cost levels must have been fantastically high 
during January-March 1972 only if for very low levels of produc­
tion (18.4 thousand tons per month - ref: same as footnote 8).
In view of the above considerations and to be somewhat conserva­
tive, the following two assumptions may be made about costs 
associated with goods carried over from that period. One, cost 
levels as of July-December 1972 are applicable to these goods 
and, second, cost levels associated with these goods are 10% 
higher than July-December 1972 levels. Accordingly, we obtain 
two estimates of total loss incurred during July-December 1972, 
as shown in table 5«
Our estimates show that total actual loss incurred during 
July-December 1972 was between Taka 5^ -9.^ 8 lakh and Taka 927.38 
lakh. Per installed loom par month, the loss was Taka 380.70- 
642.32 so that a mill of 230 looms, the most common size, was 
losing at the rate of Taka 0.95-1.61 lakh per month. This is 
certainly a tentative estimate, dependent for closeness to actual 
magnitude of loss incurred, to a large extent, on the validity of 
our assumptions regarding cost levels associated with sales out 
of stocks.
TABLE-5
ESTIMATES OE TOTAL LOSS INCURRED DURING JULY-DECEMBER 1972
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(1)
1 Receipts (in lakh Taka) \ Costs (in lakh Taka) IjTotal Loss(in lakh Tk.)
Product j
5
From j From j x }
Exports x domestic x x with salesX W  JL UII hi cl-L U  hi X  ___
ales x x out of current x At current ^ At lO^laore jbol .5+ ft Col. 5+ ^
j production j cost levels)! than current )^ ol.6  ^Col.7 *
Associated with 
sales out of stocks Total
>Je, =Col.8- j E~= Col.9 - 
* x Col.4- 5  ^ Col. 45
cost levels
( 2 ) (5) i| V) (5) ( 6 ) (7)
 5_| 0 _____________
(8) j (9) 1  (10) T~ (11)
■Hessian 2,959*05 114.91 3,073*96 1,080.11 2,103.17 2,336.85 3,416.96 3,650.65 343.00 576.69
Sacking 2,326.86 350.44 2,677-30 1,815.67 1,011.60 1,112.76 2,827.22 2,928.43 149.97 251.13
„ Carpet hacking 1,501.29 _ 1,501.29 1,127.25 430.55 473.60 1,557.80 1,600.85 56.51 99.56
TOTAL LOSS: 549.48 927.38
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IV. COST LEVELS, COST STRUCTURES AND EXERCISES 
IN COST REDUCTION
While the industry was earning reasonable profit in 
1969-70 (table 13), it incurred substantial losses during 
July-December 1972, inspite of much higher export receipts 
relative to 1969-7 0, due to very high cost of sales, as can be 
seen from table 6. The detailed breakdown of costs for the two 
periods are given in Appendix tables 5 and 6, which will form
TABLE-6
COST OF SALES AND EXPORT RECEIPTS BY PRODUCT,
1969-70 .AND .JULY-DECEMBER 1972 (TAKA PER TON)
j Cost of Sales j Kec^ipfh'Tfom"~Exports
Prodact !_96G_7o j july-Dec J % increase | 1969-70^ ? July-Dee. | % increase
0 5 1972 5 during July- 5 5 1972 5 during July-
_______ 0______ 5________ iiDec./l972. 0________ I _________jf December 1972
Hessian 2546.08 4379-82 72.02 2876.64 3932,19 36.69
Sacking 1720.36 2833.61 64.33 1578.70 2673.21 69.33
backing 300^.15 5001.13 66.13 4095.8? 4819-71 17.77
Weighted*
Average 2172.44 3803-70 75.09 2325.31 3513.34 51.09
* Weights are proportional to quantities exported of different products
9. These figures include subsidies received in the form of bonus on exports 
in addition to fab values. Prior to liberation, the rupee-US dollar exchange 
rate was Rs. 4.76 to the dollar. But the export of jute manufactures, like 
many other mainly manufactured exports, was entitled to an export bonus which 
meant a much higher receipts from exports than f,oh prices, implying much 
higher effective exchange rates, depending on the ruling bonus and premium 
rates. After liberation, the export bonus scheme was withdrawn and the curren- ; 
cy unit, renamed Taka, was devalued to be fixed at Tk.18.97 to the pound 
sterling, which implied a Taka - dollar rate of Tk.7.29 to the dollar. But now 
with the pound sterling floating relative to the dollar, the Taka - dollar 
rate rose to between Tk.7*5 - Tk. 7*7. The question of exchange rate will be 
discussed in section V.
the basis of cost reduction exercises carried out later in this 
section. It may be noted here that jute cost is the most important 
element of total costs of jute goods accounting for 40-48%, while 
wages and salaries account for about a quarter and the rest 
accounted for by other direct materials, over-heads and adminis­
trative and selling expenses.
There are two interrelated questions to be explored: 1. Why 
are cost levels in the post liberation period so high relative 
to 1969-70? 2. What possibilities exist for cost reductions? 
Obviously, the answer to the second question depends on the 
answer to the first. In so far as high cost levels are due to 
lower capacity utilization and poorer productive efficiency, 
possibilities of cost reduction should exist. But, there occurred 
certain exogenous changes in the cost conditions of the industry 
after liberation so that cost levels in this period would be 
much higher than in 1969-70 even if productive efficiency and 
capital utilization level remained the same. It will be interes­
ting to consider the implications of these cost push elements 
in terms of 1969-70 cost levels.
IMPLIED COST INCREASES FROM 1969-70 LEVELS DUE TO 
EXOGENOUS FACTORS, PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY AND CAPACITY 
UTILIZATION LEVEL ASSUMED UNCHANGED
The main cost push elements may be enumerated as follows.
1. Higher prices of jute due to increased minimum price, 
effective from 1st October, 1972, from Taka 32, ruling also in
- 14-
i
1969-70, to Taka 50 a maundU .us increase of 50.25%. Jute cost 
of production, in fact, includes any other expenses, oesides the 
price paid, incurred in connection with jute "before ibs use in 
production, such as procurement expenses, stoilug expense,-j etc. 
Hence, assuming a proportional increase in these 'other1 costs 
associated with jute11 and the same conversion ratio of jute into 
finished goods produced in the two periods, jute cosb per ton of 
goods produced in the post liberation period would be 56.25% 
higher than in 1969-70.
2. Higher wages and salaries due to adhoc raise with effect 
from May 1, 1972, as shown in table 7. The base wage/salary
12levels shown in the table were effective rates in 1969-70 also
TABLE-7
WAGE/SALARY INCREASE WITH EFFECT FROM 
MAY 1, 1972
-15-
Benefit category - By !i R ~  f incrGase 
monthly wage/salary I /_ , ' ' ,
range Haka) \ (Taka Per m0Rth)
Upto 125 25
126-225* 20
226-535* 15
336-349 Marginal adjustment
* Persons in this category getting a minimum of Taka 15O per month.
**Persons in this category getting a minimum of Taka 245 per month.
10. The market price of jute was, however, on average, more than Taka 
50 since early 1972 (see Monthly Jute Goods Statistics, BJMA Nos. 192 and 193). ' ’
11. This seems to be a reasonable assumption in view of dislocated 
market conditions and transportation difficulties in the post liberation period.
12. In early 1969, the minimum wage was fixed at Taka 125*
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Assuming that the average wage and salary levels before the 
raise were respectively Taka 125 and 250, the implied percentage 
increase in wages and salaries, on average, would be 20% and 6% 
respectively. However, in addition bo wages and. sa.lj.2.res, boniiogj 
and other allowances are received by employees, which show up in 
wage/salary cost of production. Assuming a proportional increase 
in bonuses and allowances paid, the wage and salary cost per ton 
of goods produced would now be 20% and 6% higher respectively 
than in 1969-70 provided labour productivity is the same in the 
two periods.
5. Increase in depreciation cost due to devaluation - 66% in 
aggregate, depreciation charge practice remaining the same. Hence, 
per ton of goods produced, depreciation cost should be higher 
now by 66% relative to 1969-70 for comparable output levels for 
given mill sizes.
4. Increases in the prices of spares, ranging from moderate to 
manyfold. Interviews with officials of some Jute mills have 
revealed that, on average, the percentage increase in the prices 
of spares during July-December 1972 relative to 1969-70 was 
• about 75%. Assuming comparable physical consumption of spares 
per ton of goods produced in the two periods, spares cost per 
ton should now go up by 75% relative to 1969-70.
The prices of direct materials other than Jute, viz., Jute 
batching oil, emulsifier, fuel and power etc., during July- 
December 1972 remained about the same as in 1969-70. So also, 
interest rates, tax rates and insurance premium rates remained
unchanged. For comparable output levels for given mill sizes, 
these costs per ton of goods produced should remain about the 
same.
There is no clue to quantify the change, if any, in other 
expenses, e.g. welfare expenses, incidentals etc., per ton of 
goods produced that should take place due to changed circumstances 
in the post liberation period.
Regarding administrative and selling expenses, there should 
probably be some reduction in the post liberation period relative 
to 1969-70 in aggregate for a given mill size and, hence, per ton 
for comparable output levels in the two periods due to salary 
cut at the top. For the purposes of our calculations, however, we 
shall assume that per ton administrative and selling expenses in 
the post liberation period would be the same as in 1969-70 for 
comparable output levels for given mill sizes.
Now, adjustments', as outlined above, performed on 1969-70 
costs yield the notional cost levels, as shown in table 8, for 
the post liberation period given 1969-70 levels under the assump­
tion that the productive efficiency and the capacity utilization 
levels were the same in the two periods.
It will be seen from table 8 that the actual cost levels 
of July-December 1972 were substantially higher than the computed 
levels lor all the three products. It is unlikely that the computed 
cost levels without the 5% contingency provision could have under­
estimated possible increases given the exogenous cost push elements 
as outlined above, other things remaining constant. Yet, even if
-17-
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TABLE-8
(NOTIONAL) POST-LIBERATION COST LEVELS AS OBTAINED 
BY ADJUSTMENT FROM 1969-70 COSTS(TAKA PER TON)
1) ~ "CosT^  levels FExeess of 6 Column 4 j) Column 4 as
Product j July-December 1972  Q column 3 Q as percent Q percent of
(""Computed from 5 Actuals Q over ( of column 2 5 column 3
 ___ 5 3.969-70 Costs j________( column 2 ft____________ j___________
1 ’ |R" ' 2 “ I 3 j 4 | 5 | 6
Hessian 3464.47 4379.82 915.35 26.42 20.90
(3637.69) (742.13) (20.40) (16.94)
Sacking 2321.93 2835.61 513.68 22.12 18.12
(2438.03) (397.58) (16.31) (14.01)
Carpet 4115.58 5001.13 884.55 21.49 17.69backing (4321.36) (673.77) (15.71) (13.58)
Figures in parentheses in column 2 have been obtained by allowing a 5% 
increase in aggregate in addition to adjustments outlined in text which 
yielded the other figures of the column; and figures in parentheses in 
other columns are based on figures in parentheses in column 2.
we were to allow the 5% contingency margin, there still remain 
substantial cost disadvantages in all the three productlines.
It has thus, emerged that 16.9-20.9%, 14.0-18.1% and 13.6-17.7% 
of the actual cost levels of hessian, sacking and carpet backing 
respectively in this period are possibly due to poorer productive 
efficiency and lower capital utilization level. That the capacity 
utilization and productive efficiency were significantly down in 
the post-liberation period relative to 1969-70 can be seen from 
capacity utilization and productive efficiency indicators shown 
in table 9*
TABLE-9
CERTAIN CAPITAL UTILIZATION AND PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY 
INDICATORS FOR JULY-DECEMBER 1972 AND 1969-70
| Hessian x Sacking x Carpet backing | Hessian~T | Hessian +i 1969-70 1972 I 1969-70 1972 5 1969-70 1972 i sacking i sacking +
x x x x 1969-70 1972 x carpet backing
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I 1969-70 1972
Worked looms as % of 
installed looms 90.67
84-. 95 88.28 73.97 78.05 68.87 89.88 80.97 89.31 80.00
Output per installed 
loom per year (ton) 17.25
13.88 4-4-.77 33.54 26.37 21.60 39.04 28.46 25.74 21.00
Output per loom hour 
(lbs)
7.4-6 6.4-0 20.4 18.25 15.45 14-. 87 11.71 10.25 11.50 10.60
Output per man-year 
(ton)
4.44 3.48
Output per man-hour(lb)2.70 2.01 7.4-1 5.72 5.60 4.66 4.17 3.21 4.24 3.32
Labour load per 
installed loom -
2.46 2.55
Labour load per 
worked loom 2.76 3.19
Material wastage 
(percent)
6.2 9-8
Notes: 1. 1972 refers to July-December 1972.
2. All annual figures like output per man-year Have been shown 
by doubling the July-December 1972 figures.
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It will be noticed from table 9 that capacity utilization 
as well as efficiency in the use of labour, capital and raw 
materials were significantly lower in the post liberation period 
relative to 1969-70. It may be noted that labour productivity 
declined substantially more than loom productivity (2 1.7% as 
against 7 .8% on hourly output basis), because labour load per 
worked loom was much higher in the post liberation period than 
in 1969-70 (3.19 as against 2.76), although, on installed loom 
basis, there was no alarming increase in labour force.
Circumstances responsible for poorer productive efficiency 
and lower capacity utilization level in the post liberation 
period relative to 1969-70 will be discussed and ways for 
reducing costs will be explored .in section V. However, the 
computation of possible reduction in cost levels on the basis 
of 1969-70 figures incorporating exogenous factors on the 
assumption that productive efficiency and capacity utilization 
level of 1969-70 would obtain, is one possible exercise and 
perhaps the most ambitious proposition for the shortrun. To 
face realities, it is unlikely that the productive efficiency 
of 1969-70 will be quickly restored given the order and nature 
of dislocations that have occurred in the conditions of produc­
tion .management and production processes. It should, therefore, 
be an useful approach to look at the impact on cost levels of 
the post liberation period of an assumed increase in output levels 
through improvement in capacity utilization level as well as 
productive efficiency, the latter remaining lower than in 1969-70
W
M
H
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but possibly more in line with realizeable improvement in the 
relevant conditions, and consequent likely reduction in costs.
AF EXERCISE IN COST REDUCTION UNDER ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING 
POSSIBLE INCREASE IN OUTPUT LEVELS THROUGH IMPROVEMENT IN 
CAPACITY UTILIZATION AND PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY.
Output per installed loom per year, on average for the 
three products, was about 22% higher in 1969-70 relative to 
July-December 1972. Let us assume that through improvement in 
productive efficiency and increase in capacity utilization it 
would be possible to raise the output per installed loom per 
year, and hence total output of each product, by 20%. This 
assumption does net seem overly optimistic given the very low 
level of capacity utilization and output per loom hour for each 
product in the post liberation period. Let us also make the 
following assumptions regarding consequent cost implications of 
the assumed output increase.
i) It is assumed that the 20% increase in output will 
bring about a percentage decline in wage and salary cost of one 
half of the percentage increase in output as extra paid man- 
hours may be required to raise the output.
ii) It is also assumed that the required general improve­
ment of productive efficiency for the output to increase by 20% 
will allow a 10% decline in stores consumption.
iii) Regarding costs other than materials and the above 
two elements which may for simplicity be called ’fixed costs* 
but would contain some elements which may be variable, it is
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assuined that percentage decline will be proportional to the 
increase in output.
iv) Finally, it is assumed that better waste control will 
allow a 3 percent decline in materials cost, as the wastage rate 
of 9*8% in the post liberation period is 3*8 percentage points rela­
tive to 1969-70.
Table 10 presents percentage cost composition of hessian, 
sacking and carpet backing, summarises the above assumptions 
regarding cost reduction, elementwise, and shows their overall 
implication on the cost levels.
TABLE-10
PEP TON COST REDUCTION IMPLIED BY A 20% INCREASE 
IN OUTPUT AND OTHER ASSUMPTIONS
>rodnft- 8 rnqt Rtriif'tiirp $ Percentage cost f Total J Implied j Reduced costrioauct j tost btructure  ^reduction | Aotual 5 declines $ levels
J Q element^  implied Q cost j (Taka) j (Taka)
5 5 wise j overall 5 levels j 0
  i________________if i_______ Si (Taka) j________ _______
Hessian
Wage & salary 
Stores:
Fixed costs: 
Materials:
27.1
3.5
25.3
4-2.1
10
10
20
3
2.71
0.55
5.06
1.26
__ Total: 100.0 9.58 4379.82 419.59 3960.23
Sacking
Wage and 
salary:
Stores:
Fixed costs: 
Materials:
23.3
3.8
21.9
51.0
10
10
20
3
2.33
0.38
4-.38 
1.53
—— Total: 100.0 8.83 2835.61 244.71 2590 .Vo
Carpet
backing Wage & salary 
Stores:
Fixed costs: 
Materials:
21.7 
5.7 28.1 
44.5
10
10
20
3
2.17 
0.57 
5 . 621 • 'J^ r
— -— Total: ioo y.vo 3001.13 483.01 4513.12"
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41 lakh if the sample average working days of 145 with 2.46 
shifts of 8 hours each per day is taken as the basis and 5% of 
the loom hours per shift is allowed as unavoidable loss. This 
loss of looms hours accounts for about 15% of the available loom 
hours compared to about 5% in 1969-70 similarly worked out, when 
the number of working days as well as the number of shifts per 
day were roughly comparable at 295 working days for the full 
year and 2.41 shifts per day. The main reasons for the loss of 
loom hours in 1969-70 were power failure, strikes and conversion 
of loomsbetween hessian and sacking, as revealed by our 1970 
survey. It may be noted in passing, that loom hours lost is 
greater, in both absolute and percentage terms, in both the 
periods if more working days and more hours per day are taken 
to form the basis for available loom hours. Anyxvay, the percen­
tage breakdown by reason of the loom hours lost during the 
actual working period over July-December 1972 for the sample 
is shown in table 11, and analysed below with suggestions for 
removing the bottlenecks.
TABLE-11
LOOM HOURS LOST BY REASON FOR THE SAMPLE,
JULY-DECEMBER 1972(IN PERCENT OF THE TOTAL)
Reason j Percent
Mechanical troubles 22.53Shortage of spares 19.04
Shortage of weavers 17.11Power failure 13-75Others 27.57Total 100.00
Source: Sample Survey.
-23-
It will be noted that these estimates of reduced cost levels
are significantly higher than those obtained by adjusting 1969-70
figures (table 8). The actual short term prospects may be somewhere
13in between, possibly nearer to the higher figures .
V. WAYS OF COST REDUCTION
It has been seen in the previous section that low capacity 
utilization and poor productive efficiency are major reasons for 
high costs in the post liberation period. Costs could, therefore, 
be reduced significantly through increase in capacity utilization 
and improvement in productive efficiency. The purpose of this 
section is to explore the circumstances responsible for the 
existing state of affairs and to suggest possible ways to bring 
about improvement so as to reduce costs.
A. CAPACITY UTILIZATION
Information on loom hours lost by reason is available in
the monthly reports. The reasons shown are mechanical troubles,
shortage of spares, shortage of weavers, power failure and
’others’. No loss of loom hours has been shown to be due to
strike or labour troubles in any of the reports. Total loom
hours shown lost for the sample is about d-1 lakh during July- 
December 1977. Indeed, the loom hours lost would amount to about
13. It would have been an interesting sidelight if we could 
compare cost levels of jute goods in Bangladesh with those in 
India, but clue to non-availability of reliable information on 
current cost levels in India, this could not be done in this paper.
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The most important reason for underutilization of capacity 
has been found to be mechanical troubles, claiming 22.5% of the 
loom hours lost. The machinery in our jute manufacturing industry 
are not very old and the extent of loss of loom hours due to 
mechanical breakdown, as has been found, seems rather surprising. 
But the point is that skilled technicians were not available in 
sufficient number to provide normal attention to the machines as 
non-Bangali technicians left the industry on liberation. Another 
important reason (1 7.1%) for loss of loom hours was shortage of 
weavers. Again, the main reason for this is non-Bangali weavers 
leaving the industry. Such shortage of technicians and weavers 
cannot be allowed to continue and it is, therefore, warranted 
that stock taking of personnel of these categories and their proper 
deployment are taken up urgently and programmes are designed and 
implemented to fill up the gap.
Shortage of spare parts has claimed about 19% of loom hours 
lost. Most of the spare parts for the jute manufacturing industry 
are produced domestically, in many cases certain spares are 
produced in the workshops of the jute mills themselves. But, a 
few key spares have also to be imported. The reason for the 
nature of shortage as has occurred has been both the inability 
of the domestic ancillary production to provide the necessary 
supplies mainly for want of raw materials and also failure to 
ensure regular supplies of importable spares. For immediate needs, 
some adhoc arrangements may be made which may include block allot­
ment of foreign exchange for import of spares and materials for
-Re­
producing spares domestically. But to tackle the spares problem 
in proper perspective, the iollowing two steps ai0 called for.
One, adequate government attention should be directed towards 
proper organisation and development of spares production in the 
country so that the supplies of those spares which are already 
produced domestically can be provided regularly as required and 
in good quality and the production of others can be taken up in 
due time. In view of the simple technology required, domestic 
production of spares can be efficient and will be cheaper in both 
foreign exchange and Taka terms. Secondly, it is necessary that 
arrangements are made for regular and timely importation of 
importable spares as necessary. In both the cases, the BJMC should 
play the vital role of moving the appropriate authorities with 
specific proposals after careful study and evaluation.
14Power failure claimed about 14% of the loom hours lost 
One hopes that with planned improvement in the power system and 
in the distribution of power, power failure will become less 
frequent and less intensive claiming lesser toll in terms of lost 
production of industries. Indeed, the government should give a 
high priority in the matter of improvement of power supply to the 
industries.
14. It may be noted here that recently, following the period 
covered^in this study, all the jute mills along with other 
industries ^ remained closed in Khulna zone for about a month due 
to suspension of power* One hopes this was an isolated occurrence and may not happen again.
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The remaining about 28% of the loom hours lost has been 
assigned to 'otheiU . Important elements included in 'others’ are 
not all the same for all mills all the time. It is important 
that each mill constantly reviews these residual reasons causing 
underutilization of capacity and takes appropriate actions as 
required.
B. FRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY
Poor productive efficiency in the post-liberation period is 
the result of several things, the more important ones of which 
are explained below with suggestions for improvement.
LABOUR SITUATION
Labour unrest and indiscipline became widespread in the 
immediate post liberation days. Although the situation improved 
significantly by the second half of 1972, cases of labour unrest 
and indiscipline continued to plague the industry intermittently. 
The case of Adamjee Jute Mills may be cited in this connection, 
where "go slow" policy continued throughout July-December 1972 
and the mills remained closed for 8 days in the month of Septem­
ber. Also, the Qaumi Jute Mills remained closed for 5 days in 
October 1972 for strike. Labour troubles of varying duration and 
intensity also occurred in various other mills’^ .
A good general atmosphere in factories should be as jealou­
sly guarded as possible by both the management and the workers for
1^ . Ref., Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation, Year 1972.
the good of both the parties as well as the country. Indeed, if 
the situation degenerated for whatever reasons, as happened in 
the post-liberation Bangladesh, promotion of industrial peace 
and harmony can be achieved only through sincere efforts on the 
part of both the management and the workers. As one of the fundamen­
tal reasons the present industrial unrest in Bangladesh is the 
workers' expectation of higher wages and better conditions of 
work, a good starting point may be an wages and productivity 
agreement between the management and the workers. Any review of 
wages should be linked up with the question of productivity if 
a sound basis of recovery and eventual growth of the industry is 
to be ensured. Any agreement should be worked out through dis­
cussions and negotiations between the representatives of the two 
parties. If their full cooperation is to be obtained, workers 
should be a party to the fixation of wage rates and desired produc­
tivity levels. The government, being ultimatel57 responsible for 
the management of the nationalised Jute manufacturing industry, 
should make necessary efforts in this direction. It is a step in 
the right direction that the government has recently set up a 
committee to make recommendations on industrial wage rates. The 
committee should also consider the question of desirable produc­
tivity levels. Such a committee itself may include representatives 
of workers. Total wages payable to a worker pay consist of a bs.sic 
wage part and an allowance and bonus part. While the basic wage 
structure may be the same for all industries, it may not be 
desirable to have the same total wages structure and the same
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productivity levels for all the industries. The committee may 
suggest a uniform basic wage structure for the industrial sector 
as a whole and general norms regarding allowances and bonuses 
with desirable deviations to be allowed in them in different 
industries depending on condi Lions of work ano. other relevant 
considerations. However, whatever may be the constitution of the 
expert committee, it would seem advisable that, armed with the 
recommendations of the committee, the government hold discussions 
and negotiations with the representatives of workers of each 
industry separately to work out with them an wages and produc­
tivity agreement for each particular industry. This will give the 
workers a sense of participation and they will be more likely to 
fulfil their part of the deal. Moreover, workers' participation 
in management is also desirable to give them a sense of belong­
ing and thereby induce them to give their best efforts in Jobs. 
The form and manner of their participation should be carefull5r 
worked out keeping in view proper and smooth functioning of the 
industry. Again, the workers should be a party to the final 
decision on the form and manner of their participation in the 
management of the firms they work in as this will certainly 
improve the chances of success of the scheme.
In so far as it is the law and order question, the govern­
ment should take necessary steps to restore the pule of law.
SUPERVISION
Supervision of production processes has deteriorated signi­
ficantly in the post-liberation period, perhaps mainly for want 
of skilled supervisors who were already in short supply even 
before liberation and became even more scarce due to non-Bangali 
supervisors leaving the industry. Supervision has also deteriorated 
due to conditions of lawlessness in the mills with intergroup 
rivalries and other incompatibilities creating hostile atmosphere.
Lack of proper supervision may mean the use of faulty jute 
batch, inadequate preparation of jute, irregular oil application 
and less than adequate attention to jobs generally resulting in 
high wastage rate and faulty products. The wastage rate of 9«8% 
during July-December 1972 as against 6.2% in 1969-70 indicates 
deterioration of supervision in the post liberation period.
The rate of weaving faults has also reportedly gone up.
Eor one thing, if steps are taken to improve the atmosphere 
in the mills promoting industrial peace and harmony, some improve­
ment in the quality of jobs done will result. But, to ensure a 
high standard of product quality and reduce wastage rate to the 
minimum, the quantity and quality of supervision must be sufficient­
ly increased. This will be possible only if skilled supervisors 
in sufficient number are available. It is, therefore, necessary 
that programmes are undertaken to train supervisors and deploy 
the available ones in the most effective manner.
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quality CONTROL
This was one of the weakest aspects of the Bangladesh Jute 
manufacturing industry even before the liberation. After libera­
tion, the situation has further deteriorated. A survey by the 
Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation in late 1972 revealed that 
quality control department existed only in 12 out of 73 mills 
and, in many cases, very ineffectively. Mills lack necessary 
testing equipments and qualified and experienced personnel.
In order to ensure efficiency in the production processes, 
it is essential that there is a properly equipped and manned 
quality control department in each mill to check if things are 
done properly. To be effective, the quality control department 
should be indopendent of the production unit under the direct 
control of the Chief Executive of the mill. The BJMC has recently 
taken steps to establish a quality control department in each 
mill and to equip it with necessary testing equipments and 
qualified personnel. Arrangements have been made with the 
Management Development Centre to conduct special courses for 
newly recruited quality control personnel in the mills. This is 
a step in the right direction. Success will depend, however, on 
how carefully and realistically the programme is planned and how 
effectively it is implemented. The BJMC itself has a Research and 
Quality Control Division to help the mills sort out their problems, 
help them establish effective quality control departments and to 
keep watch on their performance in this area. The division is 
still in the early stages of organization and one hopes that due 
emphasis will be given to the proper development and manning of
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this division so that it can effectively perform its functions.
INVENTORY CONTROL
The concept of inventory control is almost unknown in our
Jute manufacturing industry, as was revealed by the 19?0 survey 
and recent enquiries. An effective inventory control system is 
a highly useful cost control method. A comprehensive inventory 
control system should cover all aspects from raw materials to the 
finished goods through each stage in the production process as 
well as spare parts. Steps should be taken to design an appropri­
ate inventory control system for the industry. In the mean time 
each mill should try to avoid carrying of unnecessarily large or 
less than adequate inventories as best and as comprehensively as 
possible - a primary focus may be possible cutting down on less 
frequently used spares to avoid unnecessary costs of carrying 
them and maintaining adequate stocks of frequently used spares 
to avoid unnecessary costs that may be involved in having to 
acquire them quickly on need.
C. NORMS, INTER-FIRM COMPARISON 
AND PERFORMANCE OF MILLS
The main causes of low capacity utilization and poor 
productive efficiency and, therefore, high costs of production 
have been identified. Possible actions have also been suggested 
for solving the problems. In order to make systematic progress, 
it will be extremely useful if performance norms for the industry 
are set up in respect of productivity, costs, financial matters, 
expor4- . etc., which may be worked out on the basis of past
experiences in the country, experiences in other countries and 
detailed studies of the present realities. With norms set up, 
the current performance levels of each mill may be checked against 
them and each mill may be required to take steps to improve in 
those areas where it ialls tchina,
A more far-reaching and helpful method of appraising the s 
performance of firms to help them improve their functional effi­
ciency is available in the technique of Inter-firm comparison, 
which consists in the evaluation of the performance of each firm 
in relation to that of every other participating firm as well as 
average achievements of the whole group and also set norms, if 
available. This is done by a simultaneous study of the performance 
of different firms in an industry or business through juxtaposi­
tion of their performance data. However, the actual data pertai­
ning to a firm need not be disclosed to others, if undesirable, 
as only ratios and percentages appear in the reports. This 
comparative evaluation aims at locating the problem areas and 
weak points of individual firms and identifying the reasons 
therefor to help design necessary corrective steps so as to 
remove the bottlenecks and improve the functional efficiency and, 
thereby, the profitability of firmsV° Carefully designed, it can
16. For further details see 1. Inter-Firm Comparison - An Incentive 
To Productivity, qSEC, Paris (December 1957) and 2. Inter-frirm ~ 
Comparison - Problems and Possibilities in India, The department of 
Busmens Management and Industrial Administration, University of Delhi (1965).
provide an effective forum for promotion of co-operation among 
firms in efforts for progress. This technique is widely used in 
Western European countries, the USA and Australia, where private 
sector concerns found it useful enough to participate in such 
programmes conducted whether by Private Consultants (e.g. in the 
USA) or by Professional Organisations (e.g. in U.K.) or by 
Government Departments (e.g. in Australia). In Bangladesh, the 
technique is almost unknown.
As the Bangladesh Jute manufacturing industry is a nationa­
lised institution, inter-firm comparison of Jute mills can be 
arranged easily, on government initiative, without resistence 
from mills as the question of mill level secrecy of performance 
data is irrelevant. The Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation is 
certainly the most suitable organisation to conduct inter-firm 
comparison of Jute mills. It can be a six monthly or, perhaps, 
even three monthly feature. Initially, certain key performance 
indicators in respect of productivity, cost, financial matters, 
exports, etc., may be selected for comparison and each mill 
required to submit the relevant information as per prescribed 
time schedule. With experience, more indicators may be included 
and/or some dropped. Once the problem areas and weak points of 
a firm are identified, further study of the mill will be needed 
to ascertain the reasons therefor and design corrective measures,
which can be done by the mill management with help from BJMC 
staff.
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VI. COSTS. PROFITABILITY, EXPORT 
PRICES AND THE EXCHANGE RATE
We have explored the possibilities and ways of cost reduction in 
the previous two sections. This section will relate cost levels, actual 
and possible reduced, to foreign demand conditions to explore the viability 
of the industry vis-a-vis the exchange rate.
Table 12 presents the behaviour of cost of sales, export prices and 
quantum export of hessian, sacking and carpet backing in July-December 1972 
relative to 1969-70.
TABLE 12
CHANGES IN EXPORT PRICES, COST OF SALES AND EXPORT 
VOLUMES BY PRODUCT'.. JULY-DEC. 1972 RELATIVE TO 1969-70
ii 1969-70 July-Deeember 1972 {% change in J.1y-Dec.
Product {Export Cost of ! Quantity Export [Cost of Qnty. i1972 relative to 1969-70
{price
; (us $)
sales { 
(Taka) !
exported
(ton)*
price 
(US $)
! sales 
!(Taka)
exported{Exported{Cost of Qnty. 
(ton) {price {sales exporte
Hessian 400.09 2546.08 102119 517.39 4379.82 75252 +29.32 +72.02 -26.31
Sacking 213.05 1720.36 116019 351.73 2835,61 86946 +61.31 +64.83 -25.06
Carpect
backing 575.90 3004.15 16071 634.16 5001.13 31149 +10.12 +66.47 +93.82
* Average half yearly figures.
It will be noticed from table 1*. that, given foreign demand conditions, 
higher prices were responsible for lower exports of hessian and sacking during
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July-December 1972 relative to 1969-70, as supplies were no
17constraint (Appendix table-4-) f. The situation was relatively 
worse for hessian than for sacking as, in the former case, the 
percent increase in prices was associated with about proportional 
decline in exports while, in the latter, the decline was somewhat 
less than one half of the percent increase in prices. In the case 
of carpet backing, however, exports almost doubled in the face of 
a 10% higher price, which would suggest that there was strong 
foreign demand for carpet backing during July-December 1972.
In the case of hessian and sacking, it is possible that foreign 
demand would not have been a constraint if percentage price 
increases were of similar order as in the case of carpet backing. 
But since in all the three productlines losses were incurred 
during the period at existing cost and price levels, any lowering 
of prices would have meant larger losses for any productline, per 
unit and total. Therefore, the question of export expansion 
through lower prices is irrelevant with cost levels remaining 
where they are and exchange rate unchanged.
At this stage, it will be interesting to review the impli­
cation of the devaluation vis-a-vis the withdrawal of the export
17* One may, however, legitimately argue that there was a cons­
traint on the supply side in the form of internal transport and 
steamer space difficulties which was responsible for lower exports 
to some extent given foreign demand at existing prices. But, we do 
not have enough quantitative information to ascertain its actual 
impact. Anyway, it seems certain that lower demand at the prices 
charged was an important reason for lower exports during July- 
December 1972.
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bonus scheme. In the pre-liberation period, because of the bonus, 
prices could be kept at low levels even below cost of sales, and 
yet profits could be earned. The 1969-70 situation in this 
respect is shown in table 13.
TABLE-13
PER TON COST OF SALES, EXPORT PRICE AND PROFIT 
IN RESPECT OF JUTE GOODS, 1969-70 
(TAKA PER TON)
Product Cost of" sales
t .tstf:—
receipts Bonus
“Total
receipts Profit
Hessian 2546.08 1904.42 972.24 2876.64 330.56
Sacking 1720.36 1037.94 540.76 1578.70 -141.66
Carpet backing3004.15 2741.31 1354.56 4095.87 1091.72
UeightecT
Average 2172.44 1538.02 787.29 2325.31 152.87
*Weights are proportional to quantities exported of different products.
But, as shown in table 14, the devaluation from Taka 4.76 
to Taka 7.60 to the US dollar has, other things remaining the 
same, more than sufficiently compensated for the withdrawal of 
the bonus from the export of jute manufactures as the effective 
exchange rate for these goods in 1969-70 was Taka 7*20 to the 
dollar. This means that export prices in the post devaluation 
period in terms of dollar equal to 1969-70 levels would imply 
somewhat higher receipts in Taka terms so that the industry should 
be more profitable without the export bonus after devaluation even 
if export prices were as low as 1969-70 levels provided cost 
levels of 1969-70 could be maintained.
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TABLE-14
EFFECTIVE EXCHANCE RATES FOR JUTE GOODS EXPORTS,
1969-70
Product
TFTOTF. — f
A Receipts * l (Taka) |
P.0.B. receipts 
in US $ (Col.2 
f 4-.76)
j Total 
x receipts 
j (Taka)
fi Effective exchange 
x rate-Taka to the US i S(Col.4f Col.3)
1 5 2 0 3 5 4 1 5
Hessian 1904.4-2 400.09 2876.64 7.19
Sacking 1037*94- 218.05 1578.70 7.24
Carpet 274-1.31 575.90 4095.87 7.11backing
Weighted*
Average 1538.02 323.ll 2325.31 7.20
*Weights are the same as in table 13.
Now that costs of sales oould not possibly be brought back 
to 1969-70 levels, the realities regarding export prices, profi­
tability and exchange rate are different. Given either that cost 
levels could not be reduced at all or that they could be reduced 
around the levels suggested by our calculations or to any other 
reasonable levels, the question to explore is the implied exchange 
rate for export prices which are likely to sustain export levels 
to be maintained if profit should be greater than or at least 
not less than zero.
In recent working documents of the World Bank, it has been 
shown that, in the world market, for all the three jute products 
of hessian, sacking and carpet backing, a one percent decline in 
the price of the jute product relative to the price of synthetic 
substitutes is associated with a roughly two percent increase in 
the quantity demanded. Although, when the world demand curve
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elasticity is *• 2, exports from Bangladesh, may face a more price sensitive 
demand curve, it will be assumed, as 3s don.a in the World Bank documents, 
that the World demand curve elasticity of - 2 applies to Bangladesh, While 
prices of jute gcods tended tc rice since late 1960's, particularly since 
1970, reaching a pest Korean war peel" in 1972, the prices of polypropelene 
showed a significant downward trend, resulting in a heavy pr3.ee differential 
disadvantage for jute goods by 1972, Given this background, it may be 
assumed that prices of jute goods can be lowered significantly without 
inducing retaliatory price cuts for synthetic substitutes in the short run. 
Let us assume that prices of synthetic substitutes will remain more or less 
constant in the coming few years irrespective of what happens to the prices 
of jute goods so that a one percent decline in the pr3.ee of a jute good 
will lead to a two percent increase in its export demand. Let us further 
assume that exports of hessian and sacking from Bangladesh should be 
raised at least to 1969-70 levels and that of carpet backing by about 10% 
from July-December 1972 level. To achieve this will require price de­
creases as shown in table 15,
TABLE -JL5
PRICE DECREASES REQUITED FOR ASSUMED DEGREE OF EXPORT
PROMOTION GIVEN A PRICE ELASTICITY OF EXPORT DEMAND 07-2.
Product
JPercent incr 
[of export.t•
ease[Percent deer* 
[ease in ex- 
Jport price
-J Actual [ 
\ expert J 
i price !
Reduced
Taka
Export
! US 1D
price
. (Tk.7.6 = 1 $)
Hessian 35.70 15.85 3852.19 3230.29 425.04
Sacking 33.44 16.72 2673.21 2226,25 292.93
Carpet backing 10.00 5 00 4819.73 4578.74 602.47
Weighted Average*: 2951.73 388.39
*Weights are the same as in table 16.
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The breakeven Tala export prices and prices needed for a profit margin 
of 5% for the actual cost levels as of July-December 1972 and various estim­
ates of reduced costs are shown in table 16.
TABLE 16
TAKA EXTORT PRICES TOR BREAKEVEN AND A 5% PROPIT MARGIN FOR JULY- 
DECEMBER 1972 ACTUAL COST LEVELS AND POSSIBLE REDUCED COST 
LEVELS AND IMPLIED EXCHANGE RATE GIVEN REDUCED EXPORT 
PRICES SEOUL IN TAELS 15
Breakeven 57, profit marf in
Product
1969-70 based re­
duced cost levels
July-Dee 
sed cost
. 1972 ba­
le ve Is
1969-70 based reduced 
cost levels
July-Dec. 1972 
based cost levels
Without the 
5% contin­
gency pro­
vision
With the 
5% con­
tingency 
provision
Reduced , Actual
Without JWith the 
the 57, \ 5% con- 
contin- Itingency 
gencypro-; Provision 
vision !
Reduced
V9
J Actualii■ii
1 2 3 L i 5 6 : 7 8 : 9
1.Hessian 3464.47 3637.69 3960.23 4379,82 3637.69 3819.57 4158.24 4598.81
2.Sacking 2321.93 2438„03 2590.90 2835,61 2438,03 2559.93 2720.45 2977.39
3.Carpet 4U5>58 
backing 43216 36 4515,12 5001,13 4321.35 4537.43 4740.88 5251.19
4.Weighted* 
Average 3178.98 3406 c 05 3754.76 3173.93 3337.93 3576.35 3941.98
5. Impl ied
exchange 7.80 
rate(Row 
4 ~  $388.39)
8.19 8.77 9.67 8.19 8.59 9.21 10.15
Source: Tables 8, 10 and 15
* Weights are proportional to the target aborts of hessian, sacking and carpet
backing, on the assumptions made, of . V.^  232033 and 68528 tons per annum.20-+23c
It seems rather far fetched that costs can be reduced to the
1 Olevels implicit in export prices shown in columns 1 and 6 "• The
more hopeful preposition may be cost levels implicit in export
prices in columns 4- and 8, with those implicit, m  figures in columns
3 and 7 as possible targets. If cost levels could be reduced as
implicit in export prices shown in columns 4- and 8, even for
breakeven purposes, the exchange rate for the jute manufacturing
industry may have to be of the order of Taka 8.77 to the dollar
and to allow a meagre 3% profit margin, on average, the exchange
rate may have to be about Taka 9«21 to the dollar. If the cost
levels are not reduced at all, the dollar value should be as high
as Taka 9*67 for breakeven and Taka 10.13 for a 5% profit margin.
Keeping the problems and prospects in view, an exchange rate of
10about Taka 9»50 " to the dollar may be a good bet, which will give
the industry just short of breakeven conditions at the current
cost levels and supply clearing export prices, requiring the
industry to make all out efforts to reduce costs at ^east to the
levels implicit in export prices shown in columns 4- and 8, which
are the same as figures shown in column 4-, so as to achieve a
comfortable profit margin. It should be borne in mind that this
suggestion depends on all the assumptions made in the analysis
and should, therefore, be treated as only a rough guide.
18. Obviously, the figures in columns 2 to 4 are the various 
reduced cost estimates and those in column 5 are actual costs of 
July-December 1972.
19* It may be noted here that this rate is significantly less 
than the rate allowed for remittances from abroad by Bangalis 
earning there. The rate allowed for pound sterling remittances 
is Taka 30 to one pound sterling which gives a rate of about 
Taka 12 to one US dollar (converted on the basis of Taka 
18.97 = ore pound sterling and Taka 7*00 = one US dollar).
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It lias been seen that the Jute manufacturing incus try. is. 
incurring substantial losses in the post liberation period. The 
loss per .ton of goods produced and exported is, on average, about 
Taka 300; and the per month loss of a mill of 250 looms, the 
most common size, has been calculated to be of the order of 
Taka 0.95 - 1.61 lakh. The main reason for the losses lies in 
disproportionately high costs of sales.
It has been seen that, due to certain exogenous changes, 
cost levels would be higher in the post liberation period relative 
to 1969-70, the comparison base used, even if capacity utiliza­
tion level and productive efficiency would be the same in the
also
two periods. It has/been seen that capacity utilization level 
and productive efficiency were substantially lower in the post 
liberation period and it has been suggested that possibilities 
of cost reduction through improvement in capacity utilization and 
productive efficiency do exist, there being no improvement in the 
exogenous conditions. Suggestions have been made for bringing 
about improvement in capacity utilization and productive effi­
ciency and, thereby, cutting down on costs. It should be pointed 
out that reduction in the price of Jute, which is the most impor­
tant cost element accounting for over G0% of total costs, is 
unlikely to occur in the coming few years. Only chance of there 
ever being any possibility of reduction in the price of Jute may 
be through improvement in the yield rate and reduction in the cost 
of production of Jute; and, to be sure, this will take a number
of years to oo ic aoont, .i.f at all, if efforts are directed to 
that end. Even in the event of this happening, political climate 
will be the main determinant of any possible reduction in the 
price of Jute, if nut the deterrent. Anyway, it should be borne 
in mind that the overall Jute policy should include the improvement 
in the yield rare and reduction in the cost of production of Jute.
It has also been seen that if export is to be promoted to at 
least 1969-70 levels for hessian and sacking and to a reasonable 
level for carpet backing, it would be necessary to reduce export 
prices. By relating the 'derived} export prices for this purpose 
to cost levels, actual and possible reduced, it has been suggested 
that if the industry is, first, to recover and, then, to proceed 
to be profitable, the exchange rate for the industry may have to 
be raised, perhaps to the level of Taka 9.50 or so to the US 
dollar, inspite of all necessary steps taken for improving 
capacity utilization and productive efficiency of the industry.
The Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation has a strategic role 
to play for the recovery and progress of the industry. The 
Corporation should first identify the main problems of the 
industry and, then, take all necessary steps to solve them..
Certain things that the Corporation can do has been pointed out.
The Corporation should undertake crash programmes to solve the 
problem of shortage of technicians, supervisors and weavers. The 
Corporation should also see that properly designed quality 
control and inventory control systems are established in the mills. 
Inter-firm comparison techv; nue may be used to help mills locate
-44-
their problem areas and weak points and design appropriate steps 
to improve things.
Finally, it may be noted that only the question of tradi­
tional products has been explored in this paper. Indeed, alter­
native uses of jute also deserves a serious attention for a better 
future of the industry, but this is outside the scope of the 
present study.
i
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APPENDIX
TABLE-1
NUMBER OF JUTE MILLS IN COMMISSION IN BANGLADESH 
BY PRODUCTS AND THE COVERAGE OF MILLS IN THE S?lMPLES, 
July-December, 1972 and 1969-70
Product
| Number of Mills
j July-Lee ember 197'2 5 1969-70
0 Industry QSample Industry 3 Sample
1. Hessian, sacking 
and carpet backing 18 11 11 4-
2. Hessian and 
Sacking only 34- 9 34- 8
3. Carpet Backing 
only 14 2 1 0
4-. Spinning only 5 0 6 0
3. Cotton Bagging only 2 0 0 0
6. Total (1+2+3+4-+5) 73 22 52 12
7. Hessian and Sacking 
along with or without 
Carpet backing (1+2) 52
20 4-5 12
8* Carpet backing along
with or without hessian 32 
and sacking (1+3) 13 12
4-
SOURCE: Sample Surveys and BJMA.
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TABLE-2
INSTALLED DOOMAGE, OUTPUT AND EXPORT BY PRODUCT IN THE INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE 
AND IN THE SAMPLES, JULY-DECEMEER 1972 AND 1969-70.
... .. I ’......................  !$ July - December 1972 | 1969-70-IT -L wOl0 n a Ax Doomage j Output jj Export 1 
x (Number) j (Ton) j (Ton) j6 . 'K ..... _. .. X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .... i
5 Doomage j Output j) Export 
 (Number) j (Ton) j (Ton) 
* ..  x .. x v^ ---  -------- y x , ,
x Industry j Sample 5 t 5 s 5 t * S ! 
5 (I) 5 (S) J S 5 J !- 1  1 s I 1  I s ! 1  ) S
Hessian 14,062 5,580 82,698 38,746 75,252 35,875 13,849 3,817 2,34,608 65,831 2,04,237 58,866
Sacking 7,959 3,170 117,150 53,159 86,9^6 34,822 6,994 1,903 2,97,361 81,394 2,32,038 66,589
Carpet-backing 2,034 754 26,970 10,789 31,149 10,891 784- 287 33,008 11,204 32,142 9,742
Others 198 None 12,792 None None None None None
Source: BJMA (Monthly Jute Goods Statistics, July 1972 for 1969-70 and Statistics
Section for July - December 1972) and our Sample Surveys.
TABLE-5
LOOMS HOURS WORKED, MAN HOURS WORKED, AVERAGE DAILY 
EMPLOYMENT, AVERAGE WORKING DAYS AND AVERAGE NUMBER 
OF SHIFTS PER DAY FOR*THE SAMPLES.
July-December 1972 and 1969-70
July-December 1972 | 1969-70
Loom Hours Worked
Hessian: 1,35,55,414 1,97,73,202
Sacking: 65,25,876 89,10,161
Carpet Backing: 16,25,152 16,24,751
TOTAL: 2,17,06,442 3,03,08,114
Man Hours Worked
Hessian: 4,52,41,771 5,45,74,038
Sacking: 2,08,17,544 2,45,92,044
Carpet Backing: 51,84,235 4-4,84,313
TOTAL): 6,92,43,550 8,36,50,395
Average Daily 
Employment: 59,627 35,699
Average Working 
Days: 145 293
Average Number of 
Shifts Per Day: 2.46 . 2.41
Source: Sample Surveys.
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TABLE-A
SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION OF HESSIAN, SACKING AND 
CARPET BACKING, JULY - DECEMBER 1972.
(in Tons)
Supply fl Distribution
/-»+• 6 Stocks 0 Production j Total p CTT , fi Local * To'taT 5 StocksProduct )( as Qf | during Supply I Export Sflles jj SalQs f ag Qf
1.7.72 5 July-Dee. 5 5 5 5 5 31.12.72
_________5 5 1972 5 5________ 5 5 5_______
Hessian 53,335 82,698 1,36,053 75,252 2,764 78,016 58,037
Sacking 35,675 1,17,150 1,52,825 86,946 12,760 99,706 53,119
Backing 8'609 26’970 35,579 31,149 - 31,149 4,430
Total 97,639 2,26,818 3,24,457 193,347 15,524 208,871 115,586
Source: BJMA.
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TABLE - 5
COST STRUCTURE BY PRODUCT^JULY-DECEMBER, 1972
I
Cost Items ! Hessian Sacking !Carpet backingTaka/ton ! °L ! Taka/ton !I % _ ! Taka/ton i 71 fo
Direct Materials:
i) Raw Jute 1725.57 39.40 1374.92 48.49 2050.75 41.00
ii) Others 119.84 2.74 72.06 2.54 172.51 3.45
A. Total: 1845.40 42.14 1446.98 51.03 2223.26 44.45
Conversion Cost;
i) Wages 914.01 20.87 479.79 16.92 818.80 16.37
ii) Salaries 273.20 6.24 179.49 6.33 268.60 5.37
iii) Sub-Total(i+ii) 1187.21 27.11 659.28 23.25 1087.40 21.74
iv) Fuel and Power 134.19 3.06 63.99 2.26 148.80 2.98
v) Stores Consumption 241.41 5.51 108.23 3.82 286.29 5.72
vi) Depreciation 288.69 6.59 136.25 4.80 497.71 9.95
vii) Others 376.40 8.59 205.79 7.26 467.46 9.35
riii) Sub-Total (iv+...vii)1040.69 23.76 514.26 18.14 1400.26 28.00
B. Total Conversion Cost 2227.90 50.87 1173.54 41.39 2481.66 49.74
C. Total Manufacturing 
cost (A 4- B) 4073.29 93.00 2620.52 92.41 4710.92 94.19
D. Admn. Expenses 233.53 5.33 149.70 5.28 206.81 4.14
E. Selling Expenses 73.00 1.67 65.39 2.31 83.58 1.67
F. Total Cost of Sales 
(C4D+E) 4379.82 1 0 0 .0 0 2835.61 1 0 0 .0 0 5001.31 1 0 0 .0 0
Source: Sample Survey.
I
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2ABLE-6
COST STRUCTURE 3Y PRODUCT, 1969-70
Cost Items
Direct Materials
, ness ran _
'Talca/ tc n_(____ %_
Sacking
I Taka/ton
*,Carpet backing
%___! Taka/tog 1 %
i) Raw Jute: 1037a59 40,75 751,15 43.66 1234.26 41.09
ii) Others: 72,10 2.83 51.01 2.97 87.39 2.90
A, TOTAL: 1109,69 43.58 802.16 46.63 1321.65 43.99
flogve r si on C ocj: g :
:.) Wages: 533c 99 20.97 357.79 20.80 609.58 20.29
ii) Salaries: 147,88 5.81 84.39 4.91 101.83 3.39
ill) Sub-Total(i+ii) 681„87 26,78 442.18 25.70 711.41 23.6S
iv) Fuel an d Power 117,98 4.63 60,38 3.51 128.85 4.29
v) Stores 141,37 5.55 63.76 3.71 199.43 6.64
vi) Depreciation 163,40 6.61 82,73 4.81 211.47 7.04
vii) Others 160,24 6.29 109.56 6.37 235.50 7.84
viii) Sub-Total(iv+0. . , v i i )  587.99 23.09 316.43 18.39 775.25 25.81
B„ Total Conversion Cost: 1269,86 49.88 758.61 44.09 1486.67 49.49
C. Total Manufactur ing 
Cost (A -r B) c 2379,55 92,46 1560.77 90.72 2808.31 93.48
D. Adminir. tration Expenses : 127.51 5,o; 121.98 7.09 157.15 5.23
E. Selling Expenses: 39,02 1.53 37.61 2.19 48.68 1.29
F, Total C,„et of Sales 
(C+D-I E ) : 2546,08 100.00 1720.36 100.00 3004.15 100.00
Source: Sample Survey,
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TABLE-7
PER TON SALE VALUE, JULY - DECEMBER 1972 AND 1969-70.
(in Taka)
July-December 1972 j 1969-70
Product Total Receipts( =Fob) Jj Fob Bonus Total
Hessian 3932.19 1904.42 972.24 2876.64
Sacking 2673.21 1037-94 540.76 1578.70
Carpet backing 4819.71 2741.31 1354.56 4095-87
Source: Sample Surveys.
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